

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION NEA-11

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O 261945Z JUN 78
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3828

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 8049

STADIS////////////////////////////////////

FOR NEA - SAUNDERS FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (MONDALE, WALTER F.)
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT'S TRIP: TOUGH QUESTIONS THE VICE PRESIDENT
WILL FACE IN HIS TALKS WITH ISRAELI LEADERS

REF: TEL AVIV 7665

1. OUR REFTEL CONTAINS QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS
FOR USE DURING THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT IN PUBLIC OR
SEMI-PUBLIC SETTINGS. THE FOLLOWING LIST OF Q AND A'S
IS SUGGESTED FOR USE IN PRIVATE MEETINGS WITH ISRAELIS.
THE QUESTIONS ARE BLUNT. SO ARE SOME OF THE ANSWERS,
WHICH SHOULD NOT BE USED IN UNDILUTED FORM WITH BEGIN,
BUT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE IN OTHER BILATERALS.

2. Q. WHY IS THE U.S. ONESIDED IN PRESSURING ONLY
ISRAEL FOR CONCESSIONS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH EGYPT?

A. GIVE CREDIT WHERE IT IS DUE. WE HAVE PLAYED NO
SMALL PART IN CONVINCING SADAT TO ACCEPT FULL NORMAL
RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL IN THE CONTEXT OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT.
EGYPT NO LONGER IS DEMANDING A PALESTINIAN STATE,
ACCEPTS THE PRINCIPLE OF MINOR BORDER MODIFICATIONS

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ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, AND ACCEPTS AN ISRAELI
MILITARY PRESENCE AT LEAST DURING THE FIVE-YEAR PERIOD
FOLLOWING A PEACE SETTLEMENT. DON'T ASSUME THAT WE ARE
DOING NOTHING WITH SADAT JUST BECAUSE IT IS NOT REPORTED
IN YOUR MORNING NEWSPAPER. PRIVATE DIPLOMACY IS STILL
POSSIBLE IN CAIRO.

3. Q. WHY CAN'T YOU AMERICANS BE PATIENT? WHY MUST EVERYTHING BE DONE TODAY? WHY DO YOU HAVE TO INTERFERE IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS BY PRESENTING A PEACE PLAN OF YOUR OWN?

A. MISGUIDED PATIENCE CAN LEAD TO THE LOSS OF THE REAL OPPORTUNITY WHICH WE NOW HAVE TO ACHIEVE A VIABLE PEACE SETTLEMENT. WE ARE ANXIOUS. THIS UNIQUE SITUATION, AND EVENTS DURING THE LAST THIRTY YEARS IN THIS AREA, DEMAND IT. FROM THE START THE U.S. HAS SUPPORTED EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAVE MADE A GREAT EFFORT TO ENSURE THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS PROCEED AND THAT OUT OF THIS PROCESS A BASIS IS ESTABLISHED FOR BROADENING THE PARTIES TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. WE DO NOT INTEND TO FORCE A MADE-IN-AMERICA PLAN UPON THE PARTIES OR TO IMPOSE A SETTLEMENT. BUT IF WE FACE AN EXTENDED STALEMATE, AND THE DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES THEREIN, WE CANNOT AND WILL NOT STAND IDLY BY.

4. Q. WHAT IS THE MESSAGE YOU WILL BE TAKING TO CAIRO?

A. THE SAME MESSAGE I HAVE BROUGHT TO ISRAEL -- THAT THIS IS AN AUSPICIOUS TIME TO WORK FOR A PEACE SETTLEMENT AND THAT WE CANNOT LET THIS OPPORTUNITY SLIP THROUGH OUR FINGERS. WE WILL URGE SADAT, AS WE HAVE BEEN DOING FOR SOME TIME, TO RESUME DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL.

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5. Q. YOU CONTINUE TO SPEAK OF SADAT AS INTERESTED IN PEACE. WE THINK HE IS INCONSISTENT AND UNWILLING TO ADDRESS THE REAL ISSUES. WHAT IS HIS REAL POSITION ON THE WEST BANK WITH RESPECT TO: (A) BORDER MODIFICATIONS; (B) HIS WILLINGNESS TO BE THE ARAB INTERLOCUTOR AND SIGN A WEST BANK TREATY; (C) AN IDF PRESENCE ON THE WEST BANK; AND (D) PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION (WILL HE BE INSISTENT ON A PALESTINIAN STATE?).

A. WE BELIEVE THAT SADAT IS INTERESTED IN CONCLUDING A PEACE SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL. SADAT HAS TOLD US PRIVATELY THAT HE CAN ACCEPT MINOR BORDER MODIFICATIONS IN A FINAL SETTLEMENT FOR THE WEST BANK. HE SAID AS MUCH PUBLICLY IN AN APRIL 2 INTERVIEW IN OCTOBER MAGAZINE. HE IS ALSO WILLING, IF HE CAN GET A STRONG DECLARATION

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 TEL AVIV 8049

STADIS////////////////////////////////////

FOR NEA - SAUNDERS FROM AMBASSADOR

OF PRINCIPLES, TO ACT AS A SURROGATE FOR THE ARAB SIDE
IN THE WEST BANK/ GAZA NEGOTIATIONS IF THE JORDANIANS
REFUSE TO COME IN. CONCERNING AN ISRAELI MILITARY
PRESENCE ON THE WEST BANK, SADAT HAS INDICATED HE COULD
ACCEPT THIS DURING AN INTERIM PERIOD. HE HAS NOT SAID
ANYTHING CONCRETE ABOUT THE PERIOD BEYOND BUT WE WOULD
BE SURPRISED IF HE SO COMMITTED HIMSELF BEFORE, RATHER
THAN DURING, A NEGOTIATION. AS FOR THE ISSUE OF
PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION, SADAT HAS MADE IT CLEAR
TO US IN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC THAT THE ASWAN FORMULA
("PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE DETERMINATION OF
THEIR FUTURE") WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO HIM.

6. Q. WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY MINOR BORDER ADJUSTMENTS?

A. WE DO NOT HAVE RIGID VIEWS ON THIS QUESTION. WE
RECOGNIZE THE PROBLEMS INHERENT IN THE 1949 ARMISTICE
LINE ORDERS AND RECOGNIZE THE POSSIBILITY OF ALTERATIONS
BASED UPON SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS. WHATEVER IS ACCEPT-
ABLE TO THEM PARTIES IS ACCEPTABLE TO US. HOWEVER, AND
I MUST BE HONEST WITH YOU, I DO NOT BELIEVE THE ARABS
WILL ACCEPT SUBSTANTIAL BORDER CHANGES. IN THE CONTEXT
OF PEACE SETTLEMENT INCLUDING APPROPRIATE SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS FOR ISRAEL, ISRAEL MUST WITHDRAW FROM MOST
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OF THE TERRITORIES. THE TIMING AND THE SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE WORKED OUT IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS,
BUT ACCEPTANCE BY ISRAEL OF THE PRINCIPLE IS
A KEY TO REAL MOVEMENT TOWARDS PEACE.

7. Q. HAVE YOU RECEIVED AN EGYPTIAN COUNTERPROPOSAL?

WHAT IS IN IT?

A. OVER THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS WE HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THE EGYPTIANS NEXT STEPS AND ENCOURAGED THEM TO PRESENT A CONCRETE COUNTERPROPOSAL WHICH WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO MOVING THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD IN DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS. AS FOR THE SUBSTANCE OF THE EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL, WE DO NOT YET HAVE A FINAL VERSION WHICH THE EGYPTIANS HAVE AUTHORIZED US TO PRESENT TO YOU.

8. Q. HOW CAN THE U.S. GUARANTEE THAT THE WEST BANK WILL NOT EVENTUALLY EVOLVE INTO A PALESTINIAN STATE HOSTILE TO ISRAEL?

A. YOU KNOW WE HAVE OFTEN EXPRESSED OUR VIEW THAT WE DO NOT FAVOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINAINA STATE. NEITHER DOES EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA NOR JORDAN. RATHER, ALL WOULD IN THE END AGREE TO A PALESTINIAN ENTITY LINKED TO JORDAN. IT IS TRUE THAT NOTHING IN THE FUTURE IS CERTAIN. HOWEVER, WE THINK THAT THE LIKELIHOOD OF HOSTILE FORCES ARISING IN THE WEST BANK IS FAR MORE LIKELY IF THERE IS NO PEACE.

9. Q. WHY IS THE U.S. WITHHOLDING ARMS FROM ISRAEL? WHY ISN'T THE U.S. TAKING ACTION MATMON C? DIDN'T YOU SAY THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT WITHHOLD ARMS TO PRESSURE ISRAEL?

A. AS YOU KNOW, MATMON C IS A LARGE AND COMPLICATED ARMS PACKAGE. WE ARE EVALUATING THE CALCULATIONS AND SECRET

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ASSESSMENTS INVOLVED IN IT IN ORDER TO FULLY MEET THE CRUCIAL SECURITY NEEDS OF ISRAEL. WE HAVE ALREADY GIVEN OUR APPROVAL TO A NUMBER OF ITEMS IN MATMON C. WE ARE STUDYING THE REMAINING REQUESTS AND WILL PROVIDE ANSWERS ON THEM. BUT THE DELAY IS BECAUSE THE ISSUES ARE COMPLEX. IT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE PEACE PROCESS.

10. Q. IT WAS PRINCIPALLY AT YOUR DEMAND THAT WE WITHDREW FROM SOUTH LEBANON. UNIFIL HAS NOW TURNED INTO A QUARTERMASTER CORPS FOR THE TERRORISTS AND MORE ARE INFILTRATING SOUTH. WHAT ARE YOU GOING TO DO NOW?

A. WE BELIEVE THAT UNIFIL IS DOING A GOOD JOB GIVEN THE TERRAIN AND DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES. IT IS TRUE THAT CERTAIN AD HOC ARRANGEMENTS, WHICH WE OBJECTED TO, WERE WORKED OUT BY UNIFIL IN ORDER TO PERSUADE ARMED PALESTINIANS TO WITHDRAW NORTH OUT OF ITS ZONE OF RESPONSIBILITY. WE ARE CONTINUING TO USE OUR INFLUENCE WITH THE UN SECRETARIAT TO ENSURE THAT UNIFIL STRIVES TO PREVENT THE INFILTRATION OF ARMED PERSONNEL INTO ITS AREA. IN ANY EVENT, IT IS OUR PRESUMPTION THAT ISRAEL

HAD NO WISH TO REMAIN INDEFINITELY IN SOUTH LEBANON.
UNIFIL IS WORKING, IF SOMETIMES FITFULLY, AND BOTH THE
U.S. AND ISRAEL SHOULD SUPPORT IT IN EVERY WAY. FOR IF
IT FAILS, ALL OF US WILL SUFFER. THE MAJOR OBSTACLE
IT FACES AT THIS MOMENT IS THE LACK OF COOPERATION FROM
THE CHRISTIAN MILITIAS -- AND WE HOPE ISRAEL WILL USE
ALL ITS INFLUENCE WITH THOSE GROUPS TO HELP UNIFIL
COMPLETE ITS DEPLOYMENTS IN THE CHRISTIAN-HELD AREA.
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